LIBERAL PACIFICATION AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF VIOLENCE

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Abstract: While International Relations scholars make many claims about violence, they rarely define the concept. To address this gap, this article develops a typology of three distinct kinds of violence: direct, indirect, and pacification. Direct violence is when a person or agent inflicts harm on another. Indirect violence is manifested through the structures of society. We propose a third understanding of violence: pacification. Using a phenomenological methodology, and drawing on anarchist and post-colonial thought, we show that the violence of pacification is diffuse, inconspicuous, intersubjective, and structured into the fabric of society. This understanding of violence has significant implications for the study of international relations, notably research on the liberal peace. We show that liberal peace scholars only account for direct violence and equate the decline in that kind of violence with peace. We counter that the spread of liberal institutions does not necessarily decrease violence but transforms it. Our phenomenological analysis captures empirical trends in human domination and suffering that liberal peace theories cannot account for. It reveals how a decline in direct violence may coincide with the transformation of violence in ways that are concealed, monopolized and structured into the liberal order. We call this process liberal pacification.

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“They plunder, they slaughter, and they steal: this they falsely name Empire, and where they make a wasteland, they call it peace.”

-- Tacitus, Agricola, ch. XXX (1914)

Introduction

Canonical texts in International Relations define peace as the absence of violence (Aron 1973, 21; Bull 2012, 18; Clausewitz 1976, 75; Waltz 1959, 1, 1979, 343). However, a glance at the philology of the word “peace” reveals that its relationship to violence is far more complex. The Latin words for peace (pax, pacis, paco) trace their roots to the verb for a pact (pacisci) “which ended a war and led to submission, friendship, or alliance” (Weinstock 1960, 45). As Rome transitioned from republic to empire, pax changed its meaning from a pact among equals to submission to Rome, and “pacare began to refer to conquest” (Weinstock 1960, 45).

Two monuments built by Augustus, the first Roman Emperor, record this shift in the meaning of peace. The first, the Ara Pacis Augustae, a monument to the goddess of peace, commemorates Augustus’ pacification of Gaul and Spain (Kleiner 2005, 212). The second, the funerary inscription Res Gestae Divi Augusti, appeared on Augustus’ tomb and celebrates his many accomplishments, including bringing peace to the sea, Gaul, Spain, and the Alps. Crucially, the term used to characterize this peace is pacavi, which means pacified. Pacavi is not the absence of violence but the use of violence to reorder the world into a Roman Empire. Thus, Pax Romana meant eliminating the threat of war – both civil and foreign – through the preponderance of Roman military might.

Romans understood peace as including not only the absence of violence but also the forceful creation and maintenance of a political order: pacification. Modern scholars in the field, however, understand violence and peace as antonyms. While some researchers question the meaning of peace (Martin 2005; Richmond 2008), the field has not scrutinized

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Pacare is a conjugation of paco, the Latin verb meaning to pacify or subdue.
its concepts of violence. In fact, scholars of international relations seldom even use the term (Thomas 2011, 1815–16).

Inspired by this anamnesis analysis of pax, we argue that violence functions as a structural feature of the world – even a seemingly peaceful world. Violence is not the absence of peace but rather, as the Romans recognized, the ordering feature of the pax. Violence constitutes modern society. To develop this account, we argue that violence should be understood phenomenologically. A phenomenological account identifies violence as a structural feature of the world, contributing to the conditioning and enabling of our engagements in this world. We define this relational process as pacification: the process of rendering invisible what scholars in the field identify as direct and indirect violence. Our phenomenological account does not contest the character of violence (harm, death, etc.). Instead, we focus on revealing how violence structures our world. Our approach draws on Heideggerian phenomenology, as well as anarchist and post-colonial theory, to reframe how we might theorize what violence is.

To demonstrate what is gained by understanding violence phenomenologically, this paper proceeds in four parts. In part one, we expose the conceptual gap at the heart of much International Relations scholarship about violence. We show that scholars generally conceptualize violence as either direct (i.e. the consequence of empirically identifiable behaviors) or indirect (i.e. behaviors that in the aggregate cause violence via the institutions of modern society). Across the mainstream and critical literatures alike, scholars understand violence as a specific thing, the effects of which can be observed, counted, measured and potentially eliminated. In part two, we introduce a phenomenological methodology for theorizing violence. We turn to phenomenology to show how violence operates even when it is unobservable. This approach uncovers how observable violence can function as a rupture that reveals the hidden violence of pacification. In part three, we use anarchist and post-colonial thought to demonstrate our phenomenological account of violence as pacification.

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3 An exception is Elizabeth Frazer and Kimberly Hutchings who have sought to expand theoretical understandings of the concept. See also Calkivik (2016) and Rodriguez-Alcazar (2017).

4 Anamnesis is “a critique based on the forgetting of past heritage” (Baron 2018, 30; cf. Havercroft 2011, 24–28).
Pacification, as we use the term here, is the process of rendering violence invisible. It is central to the development of the liberal world order. Anarchist thought reveals the pacification in liberal capitalism. Post-colonial thought reveals the pacification of colonial projects. Both traditions demonstrate how violence functions phenomenologically. In part four, we demonstrate the theoretical value of our tripartite classification of violence: direct, indirect, and pacification. Our understanding of pacification as violence allows us to account for both the empirical observation of the liberal peace as leading to a decline in direct violence and the claim that the Pax Americana represents an increase in violence overall.

**Conventional and Critical Understandings of Violence in International Relations**

Both mainstream and critical scholars of international relations understand violence as something done by an individual or a group to other individuals or groups. Violence is instrumental, a tool or a piece of equipment deployed for particular purposes such as deterrence or compellence. Direct violence occurs when one person or agent inflicts harm on another. Researchers often measure direct violence using battlefield deaths, homicide rates or other forms of body counts. Indirect violence is mediated through the structures of society, such as poverty or famine, which produce higher than average death rates. In both understandings, violence involves a causal relationship between agents and targets or victims. As a consequence, strict empiricist researchers typically assume that the effects of violence are visible and measurable.

The democratic and liberal peace literatures, perhaps the most prominent discussions of violence in international relations, serve as a case in point. Liberal scholars argue that the spread of liberal institutions, including democratic governance, international trade, and human rights norms, result in an overall decline of inter-state violence (Doyle 1983; Rosecrance 1986; Mueller 1989; F. H. Oneal, Maoz, and Russett 1996; J. R. Oneal and Russett 1999; Goldstein 2012). Steven Pinker (2012) recently expanded this claim. Not only does Pinker document declining warfare between nations, he also points to reductions in other forms of violence, including homicide, terrorism, rape, child abuse, capital punishment, and cruelty to animals. Pinker contends that the decline of war and the success of the new liberal order has relegated violence to isolated acts of terrorism and local instances of civil and ethnic conflict, most of which take place outside the liberal world order.
Yet liberal theorists’ observations appear at odds with the violent turmoil of our time. In order to contest the liberal account of expanding peace, critical scholars in the field point to refugee crises, ecological devastation, financial collapse, nuclear proliferation, drone warfare, widespread government repression, police violence, mass incarceration, a grotesque concentration of wealth on a planetary scale, the rise of the far right, and much more. These critical accounts introduce the concept of indirect violence to capture ways that institutions and structures inflict harm. Yet, as we will show, neither direct nor indirect theorizations of violence fully account for the pervasiveness of such disparate experiences and structures of violence.

Direct Violence

The concept of direct violence treats violence as an instrument, as “the use of physical force to inflict injury or to cause damage to a person or property” (Thomas 2011, 1817 and 1828). This approach limits violence to observable instances and effects, usually killing and death. Liberal peace research rests on this definition of violence. Notably, prominent quantitatively oriented scholars use battlefield deaths as a proxy for violence to empirically test their claims that the promotion of democracy, economic interdependence, and international institutions have led to a decline in violence.

5 Post-colonial societies are commonly depicted in terms of “[l]awlessness and criminal violence” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006, 6) and the Western world, for all its wealth and resources, appears unable or unwilling to adequately respond to humanitarian refugee crises in which one percent of the entire human population is now displaced from their homes (Connor and Krogstad 2016). Oxfam (2017) reports that eight men now own the same wealth as the poorest half of the world’s population. This has rendered large swaths of humanity “superfluous,” unneeded by the capitalist world economy (Mbembe 2017, 3, also: 2001; Simone 2008)

6 Liberal peace researchers investigate the claim that liberal democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with each other (Doyle 1983; Russett et al. 1993; F. H. Oneal, Maoz, and Russett 1996; Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994; Owen 1994). Many researchers use battlefield deaths as a proxy for violence to empirically test this claim. Oneal and Russett have made the strongest version of this thesis, asserting that the interlocking of liberal institutions has led to
While much of the academic debate about the liberal peace focuses on how liberals define terms such as “war” and “peace,” few scholars scrutinize how liberal peace researchers understand violence. Instead, researchers debate methodological and political issues. Some argue that “the scientific claim of peace among democracies . . . is not value free” because it uses the US-centric model of democracy as the norm against which all other regime types are coded (Oren 1995, 266; Scoble and Wiseberg 1981; Bollen 1993; Lemke and Reed 1996; Kegley and Hermann 1996). David Spiro (Spiro 1994) raises questions about which cases liberal peace researchers include and exclude when considering possible conflicts. Others point out that the narrow focus on interstate war ignores cases of democracies engaging in covert actions against other democratic regimes and cases of democratic civil wars (Barkawi and Laffey 1999b; Kegley and Hermann 1996; Cohen 1994).

Debate between liberal peace theorists and their critics focuses on how the operationalization of terms produces the observed effect. Critics raise questions about the independent variable (what counts as a liberal democracy) and some ask what counts as war in terms of the intensity of a conflict and the numbers of deaths (Spiro 1994; Raknerud and Hegre 1997; Ray 1993; Ray, Kegley, and Puchala 1998; Layne 1994). For all this conceptual scrutiny, there is no corresponding enquiry into what is meant by violence.

As an example of how scholars avoid defining violence, consider Steven Pinker’s *The Better Angels of Our Nature* (2012). The book’s subtitle claims to provide “a history of violence and humanity,” yet the book does not offer any definition of violence. In response to the global decline in violence (J. R. Oneal and Russett 2001). Some liberals explore the links between international trade and interstate peace (Gartzke 2007; McDonald 2009, 2010; Mousseau 2009; Weede 1995) and the role of international institutions such as the UN in preventing wars and keeping peace between states (Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004; Dorussen and Ward 2008; Kinne 2013; Mack 2008, 85; Russett, Oneal, and Davis 1998; Wilson, Davis, and Murdie 2016). Scholars note the absence of violence since the end of the Cold War (Mack 2008; Pinker 2012, chap. 6) or defend the role of the liberal international legal order in reducing global armed conflict (Hathaway and Shapiro 2017; Kumm et al. 2017; Owen 1994; Rodrigues 2017; Sapiano 2017; Corradetti 2017; Sweet and Palmer 2017).
question “How do you define violence?” on the FAQ section of his personal website, Pinker (2017) does offer the following answer:

I don’t. I use the term in its standard sense, more or less the one you’d find in a dictionary (such as *The American Heritage Dictionary Fifth Edition*: “Behavior or treatment in which physical force is exerted for the purpose of causing damage or injury.”) In particular, I focus on violence against sentient beings: homicide, assault, rape, robbery, and kidnapping, whether committed by individuals, groups, or institutions. Violence by institutions naturally includes war, genocide, corporal and capital punishment, and deliberate famines.

Pinker notes just one of the three possible definitions in that dictionary and then narrows his focus to physical force. In subsequent questions he criticizes other uses of the term violence as metaphorical and explicitly discounts economic inequality as violence (Pinker 2017).

Definitions of peace as the absence of violent death are pervasive. Realist, behaviorist, and rational choice researchers employ concepts such as deterrence and compellence to describe violence as a tool that is rationally wielded to achieve a desired end (Schelling 1990; Stein 1992; Lebow and Stein 1990; Petersen 1986). Similarly, the ethics of war literature treats violence as perpetrated by one actor or sets of actors against others, permitting a selective ascription of moral value (Doyle and Macedo 2011; Walzer 2006; Rengger 2013). Scholars of humanitarian intervention in turn treat violence as a form of statecraft (Finnemore 2005; Keohane 2010; Lang 2001; Vincent 2015; Wheeler 2003). A subtle but critical inflection of this argument is developed by Mark Neocleous and scholars working within a radical Marxist tradition (Neocleous 2010a; Neocleous, Rigakos, and Wall 2013). Neocleous and collaborators unsettle the distinction between war and peace, focusing on the perpetuation of war in the securitizing of peace. They draw attention to the direct violence of policing and counter-insurgency and its role in sustaining *pax*. They also show how this type of violence entrenches what they call the “social war of capital” (Neocleous

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7 The other definitions of violence from the *American Heritage Dictionary* include: “a. Intense force or great power, as in natural phenomena: the violence of a tornado. b. Extreme or powerful emotion or expression: the violence of their tirades” and “Distortion of meaning or intent: do violence to a text.” See https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=violence [accessed June 2016].
2010a, 9). These authors argue, as we do, that violence creates observable zones of pacification. However, Neocleous and collaborators view direct violence as the primary instrument of pacification, a point we explore and contest further below (see f.n. 9).

While the parsimony of these accounts is appealing, there are significant drawbacks to these approaches. Direct accounts of violence discount other kinds of harm in the world as not violent, thereby dismissing the possibility that invisible forms of violence produce harm. Scholarly accounts of direct violence may even conceal other forms of force, harm, and injury by conceptualizing violence in instrumental terms and by limiting their understandings of violence to acts of physical harm that can be directly linked to agents. This is the critique raised by scholars who contend that violence is more complicated and adopt a conception of violence as being structural and indirect.

### Indirect Violence

Efforts to conceptualize violence as indirect take a wide array of theoretical and methodological forms, including post-positivist, Marxist, post-structuralist and feminist. By indirect violence we mean the aggregate actions of social groups and institutions that cause violence on other social groups. Indirect forms of violence still “kill,” but do so “slowly, and undramatically from the point of view of direct violence” (Galtung and Höivik 1971, 73). Unlike scholars who employ the proxy of battlefield deaths (and the binary dead/alive), indirect violence can be measured by examining “the number of avoidable deaths that occur” (Galtung and Höivik 1971, 73). For example, researchers might compare the life expectancy of someone in one country (say, Guinea) and someone in another country (say, Sweden), or someone within the same country but hypothesized as living without structural violence (Köhler and Alcock 1976). Whereas theories of direct violence assume one agent inflicts harm on another agent, theories of indirect violence examine how larger social groups, institutions, and processes inflict harm in the aggregate, and often unintentionally.

Post-positivist scholars further widen the scope of how violence is theorized and understood, but rarely question the concept of violence itself. David Campbell and Michael Dillon (1993, 2), for example, note the ontological character of violence. However, their focus is not on violence itself but on the “reasoning subject.” R.B.J. Walker’s contribution to the post-structuralist literature on violence provides a list of multiple direct, metaphorical, and structural examples of violence that “may be known under many names: oppression,
injustice, inequality, crime, punishment” and which may be described by such historically contingent terms as “alienation and commodification” and through the technological “homogenizing” of human subjectivities (Walker 1993, 139). Recounting the underlying narrative of violence is, Walker suggests, one means by which we can work “for its eradication” (Walker 1993, 139). Yet, when it comes to international relations (as opposed to capitalism), his commentary is limited: “In the context of the state system, by contrast, violence is more obviously violence” (Walker 1993, 139). Scholars working within various post-positivist traditions shed light on its many multifaceted, insidious, and discursive forms but still assume that violence is a discrete and observable thing. Surprisingly, this understanding sits close to liberal assumptions and undercuts the power of the post-structuralist critique.

Feminist scholars in the field offer complex and deeply social understandings of violence, including studies of the effects of patriarchy on social structures. Feminist approaches draw attention to gender-based violence (Enloe 2014), the ways perpetrators and victims are socially constituted, the relationship of violence to the body and social constructions of gender, and how such relations make and remake our social orders. However, feminist scholars may limit their understandings of violence to observable phenomena. Feminist researchers draw attention to rape as a strategy of war, for example, and point to continuities between violence during times of war and peace (Enloe 2000; Hansen 2010; Kirby 2012; Hirschauer 2014; Meger 2016). Much of this scholarship questions the normalization of the gendered assumptions that men are the sources of violence and women its objects (Kinsella 2011; Tickner 2013; Sjoberg 2013; Sjoberg and Gentry 2007; Elshtain 1987). Gendered categories shape who is protected and who remains subject to “sexual violence, forced conscription, and sex-selective massacre” (Carpenter 2006a, 83, 2006b). In doing so, feminist scholars focus on how violence is distributed, authorized, located, and embodied, and develop methodologies for studying these processes (Wibben 2016). Laura Shepherd argues that whereas “violence is conventionally conceived of as a functional mechanism,” both violence and security can be understood by examining how “gendered violence…‘marks and makes bodies’” (Shepherd 2007, 240). Similarly, Lauren Wilcox employs a gendered and structured understanding of violence to methodologically ground her analysis of violence as embodied. However, the specific acts Wilcox considers – torture, force-feeding, suicide bombing, and targeted killing via drones – are all acts that
remain identifiable and observable (Wilcox 2015, 7) and function causally rather than intersubjectively.8

Neither direct nor indirect theorizations of violence account for the pervasiveness of other forms of violence in the world. In addition to direct and indirect violence, we propose a third type of violence: pacification. We now turn to phenomenology to uncover it.

Towards a Phenomenology of Violence
To illustrate the limits of both direct and indirect accounts of violence, consider the following thought experiment. A man enters a home with a gun, points the gun at the family, and begins to make requests of the family. The family, intimidated by the implied threat of the gun, complies. Is this interaction violent? Most people would probably agree that, yes, it is, since the implied threat of force terrorizes the family. However, neither the direct nor indirect conception of violence adequately captures the violence of this scene. In this example, any physical violence committed by the gunman would be direct violence, and any causal, lasting yet largely unseen effects (e.g. a heart attack induced later by the stress of attack) might be considered indirect violence. While direct and indirect violence both focus on measured effects of violence, our point is more fundamental. We offer a third conception of violence to make sense of such scenes.

Acts of violence do not only inflict physical (and/or psychological) harm, they also restructure the social and political world. For example, the family being attacked might be a white South African family who live within a gated complex. The barbed wire crowning the compound walls, the bars on all the doors and windows, and the private security guard posted out front are everyday examples of how this family lives in constant fear of exactly such a gunman. The assailant might come from a family that suffered under apartheid’s racialized social order and might not have benefited from the society’s democratization and liberalization. If the gunman scales these walls and inflicts wounds — physical or otherwise — then one would clearly say that violence occurred. However, what if the barbed wire, barred windows, and private security guard successfully kept the gunman at bay? The family goes about its daily routine, but is the world any less violent? The presence of wall and barbed wire might mean that instances of observable violence decrease, but the

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8 We follow Charles Taylor’s (1971) definition of intersubjectivity (see below).
society remains — in its very lived, material and psychic forms — structured by violence. Violence constitutes the worldhood.

Data showing that direct violence is on the decline obscures the intensification of other forms of violence. To take the United States as an example, rapid and historically unprecedented increases in economic inequality since 1970 have coincided with the pacification of militant political opposition such as rioting, guerrilla warfare, and political assassinations (see Figure 1). The dynamics of rioting, guerrilla warfare and assassinations throughout the first half of the twentieth century exposed increasing discontent with perceived systemic injustice, including capitalism, patriarchy, imperialism, colonialism, and white supremacy. These forms of violent political resistance have been suppressed in liberal

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9 The contentious event counts are from the Cross-National Data Archive (Banks and Wilson 2017), which is based on New York Times reports. The inequality variable reflects the top decile income share (including capital gains), in the United States (Piketty 2014).
society over the past fifty years (Murphy 2017). A restructuring of social relations has led to a displacement and co-optation of violent protests against the perceived injustices of the world order. This restructuring represents a third type of violence called pacification.¹⁰

The hallmark of this third type of violence is that the structures of domination ensure that resistance in the form of direct violence against this order is less frequent. There are numerous ways that implicit and explicit threats, global surveillance, imbalances in military power, displays of military might, occupations, blockades, nuclear deterrence, terrorism and counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, sanctions, trade disputes, and embargoes, to name a few examples, restructure intersubjective relationships in global politics. By focusing solely on discrete acts of physical harm and quantifiable events, such as body counts, scholars do not and cannot capture the restructuring consequences of these acts. Our third account of violence hypothesizes that restructuring of social and political worlds might well lead to fewer acts of direct violence if the restructuring deters agents from engaging in direct violence. The restructuring might also lead to less quantifiable physical harm, direct or indirect. However, this decrease may be achieved through an intensification of pacification.

Pacification operates through different modes of power other than direct and indirect violence. Drawing on Raymond Duvall and Michael Barnett’s (2005, 48) typology of power, direct violence corresponds to compulsory power, indirect violence to structural and institutional power, and pacification to some elements of institutional and productive power. Most critical approaches to violence and power focus on structural power (what we refer to as indirect violence). Liberalism deploys all three kinds of violence in order to sustain itself. Our point is that the third kind of violence is the most difficult to observe and, if it is operating effectively, it will correlate with the absence of direct violence (see Figure 2). It is difficult to observe pacification because it is diffuse and involves the coercive reordering of

¹⁰ Our account of pacification differs from those of Neocleous et al (2010b; 2013; 2011). We push beyond an account of violence and peace as material or institutional forms of violence, and towards an account of violence that encompasses a richer phenomenology. In their account, pacification operates through direct and indirect violence. In our account pacification is a third kind of violence that makes instances of the first two kinds of violence less likely.
social relations. Phenomenology, with its focus on background practices and the constitution of social relations, provides a methodology for uncovering this form of power and its related kind of violence.

The first step in this theoretical development is to recognize the intersubjective character of violence. The meaningful structures of our world do not exist independently of us. Our identities are in a co-constitutive relationship with our society’s institutions, practices, shared meanings, and norms (Taylor 1971, 27). “The expression ‘phenomenology’ signifies primarily a methodological conception,” able to uncover not just things themselves, but phenomena that are hidden yet are fundamental to our being (Heidegger 1962, 59). These structures include different types of beings or entities, and how our being makes sense of and functions in this world (Dreyfus 1991, 32). A phenomenological account of violence, therefore, examines the ways that violence is not simply a thing; violence structures the world, along with our understanding and ability to function in this world.

There are, however, different worlds (Heidegger 1962, 93). Martin Heidegger offers a tripartite classification. The first (1) is the world of physical objects. The second (2) is a world of shared-practices and shared-beliefs. The third world (3), what Heidegger calls “worldhood,” is the ontological-existential sense of world (1962, 93). Direct violence operates in the first world. Indirect violence operates in the second world. Pacification as violence exists in this third world (worldhood).

Within world three the ontological character of violence is not that of an object; it is the structuring of the intersubjective relations of our being-in-the-world. Most of the time we are able to function in our surroundings because of our ability to cope with that which we encounter; we know how to act in certain situations and what specific purpose specific things serve. Sometimes, however, something breaks down or malfunctions. In such situations the object, relation or worldhood reveals itself (Heidegger 1962, 105). This revealing is when the inconspicuous becomes conspicuous. By understanding violence as a part of worldhood, violence functions as a moment of revealing, of making the inconspicuous conspicuous. In this way overt acts of violence (direct or indirect) reveal

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11 While Heidegger’s phenomenology in Being and Time does not address either politics or violence, Hannah Arendt’s (1970) work illuminates the political implications of a phenomenological critique of violence. In her critique, violence takes on similar
elements of our world that otherwise remain hidden but are nevertheless there. Whether
doing violence to a text, or violence breaking out in a pub, both bring out grievances and
animosities that are otherwise dormant, perhaps simmering, waiting to be released. The
violence of a riot is a visible expression of a worldhood characterized by unseen or ignored
social relations.

**Typology of violence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Direct Violence</th>
<th>Indirect Violence</th>
<th>Pacification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Observability</td>
<td>Conspicuous</td>
<td>Conspicuous</td>
<td>Inconspicuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phenomenological structure</td>
<td>World of physical objects (world one)</td>
<td>World of shared-practices and shared-beliefs (world two)</td>
<td>Worldhood, ontological-existential (world three)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causality2</td>
<td>Agent to agent</td>
<td>Mediated through institutions and structures</td>
<td>Constitutive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effects</td>
<td>Body counts, battlefield deaths, murders, counted instances of physical harm (direct)</td>
<td>Population-wide mortality rates, effects of inequality over time (indirect)</td>
<td>Diffuse. Indications of suffering that inversely correlate with instances of direct violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjectivity</td>
<td>Atomistic / individualistic</td>
<td>Institutions and societal structures</td>
<td>Intersubjective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of power</td>
<td>Compulsive</td>
<td>Institutional and structural</td>
<td>Structural and productive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2**

characteristics as any other technology that breaks. However, the type of breakdown that occurs through violence differs from Heidegger’s because violence involves people’s interactions with each other (and not primarily with other objects). Arendt’s treatment of violence rests on this distinction.
Our typology of violence distinguishes between direct, indirect and pacification (see Figure 2). The typology distinguishes six different characteristics across the three types of violence, and notes how they correspond to Duvall and Barnett’s (2005, 48) four types of power. Pacification as violence is inconspicuous. It pertains to our worldhood in a constitutive fashion. It is intersubjective and it is diffuse. These characteristics, taken together, identify pacification in ontological-existential terms.

Researchers rarely, if ever, consider violence that falls under the ontological-existential category. What counts as violence within International Relations scholarship might be understood instead as brief moments when the largely invisible structuring of the world becomes visible: direct violence is *epiphenomenal*. To rephrase Heidegger, direct and indirect violence mark breakdowns that reveal part of the nature of the world, but violence remains a part of this world that it reveals.

Phenomenology, as we are using it, is not about lived-experience. It is, instead, the philosophical tradition of revealing the different types of beings and things that contain meaning in our world, the structures and/or contexts in which these beings and things exist, and how these structures and contexts provide the meaning for these beings and things. Understood in this way, violence is one of these structures and/or contexts. A phenomenological perspective does not approach violence from a particular normative position, although it does not preclude normative critique. A phenomenological approach does not treat violence as a discrete thing that one agent does to another, although it does not preclude such acts being described as violent. Instead, a phenomenological perspective adds to our intellectual and methodological toolbox about violence. In addition to direct and indirect violence, phenomenology identifies violence as a condition or context in which people function. Phenomenology allows us to identify violence occurring in ways and in places that we otherwise would not be able to recognize. It does not change the meaning of violence (as harm, for example). Instead, it treats violence ontologically, which enables us to reveal more accurately the extent to which violence exists in the world.

From a phenomenological perspective, violence is often inconspicuous. It pertains to those manifestations that do not reveal themselves but simply exist as a part of the world we live in, as necessary, naturalized or internalized regimes of compulsion or domination. Yet when we look for inconspicuous forms of violence, we reveal them and
make them conspicuous. Examples that highlight this kind of violence include the erasing of tradition and the enforcement of particular legal codes at the expense of indigenous cultural norms (Cocks 2014). When pacification reveals itself and becomes conspicuous, violence loses its inconspicuous character and, in turn, reveals further incidents of its inconspicuousness. While liberal scholars treat violence as sets of isolated incidents, this approach allows us to understand the prevalence of violence as part of the structures of our world. In understanding violence phenomenologically, as a structure of revealing across multiple worlds, we are better able to witness the extent to which violence shapes our world, and how we are then shaped by violence.

**Pacavere**

The Romans understood violence as a necessary condition for *pax*: The liberal imagination blinds itself to the ways that pacification functions as violence in our world order. International Relations scholarship’s strict distinction between peace and violence reinforces this obfuscation. Yet the violence of (and in) pacification is central to the contemporary world. A phenomenological approach shows that moments of violent rupture are not aberrations of the world order; violent outbreaks are breakdowns of pacification. It follows that the multiple structures of the world order function as the violence of pacification, of *pacavere*. These structures include liberal capitalism, colonialism and the post-colonial aftermath, and war. Each functions as a key site of pacification. Anarchist thought reveals the pacification in liberal capitalism. Post-colonial thought reveals the pacification of colonial projects. Both anarchist and post-colonial thought demonstrate how war is a breakdown of pacification, revealing the hidden violent structures of our worldhood.

Anarchist critiques of capitalism, unlike Marxist and liberal interpretations, take seriously the decisive role of state violence in structuring society and markets. Anarchists view the state as an institution that sustains elite appropriations of political and economic power (Proudhon [1861] 1998; Prichard 2015; Sorel 1999). Those at the bottom of the social hierarchy bear the costs of this enforced order. The state diffuses violence (i.e. pacification) throughout the entire society — often in ways that go unrecognized by its subjects (Sorel

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12 *Pacavere* is a conjugation of *paco*. 
1999, 65). The naturalization of violence consolidates arbitrary regimes of domination in society. While specific, countable incidents of violence may decline, the social order itself is premised in large part on the threat of violence for contravening social norms making specific, countable incidents of violence relatively rare (Kinna and Prichard forthcoming).

What are the costs of this consolidation? What are we not accounting for? Anarchist thinkers view rising inequality in the context of declining riots, insurgencies and assassinations (see Figure 1) as evidence of pacification. Incidents of proletarian violence, anticolonial violence, riots and protests are all examples of resistance to the “regimes of domination” that shape contemporary society, regimes easily identifiable by those subject to them (U. Gordon 2007, 33). Drawing on these accounts, we interpret declining rates of riots as a sign of increased violence as pacification, rather than as evidence that the system is becoming less violent. Conversely, eruptions of anti-state and anti-capitalist direct violence are signs of a breakdown in pacification. Much like Heidegger’s example of broken equipment (1962, 102–3, 412–13), which draws our attention to the background structures of our world, brief instances of direct violence may reveal violently structured social relations.

While liberal imagination obscures the centrality of violence, violence has always been central to the liberal world order — to the liberal worldhood — particularly during the colonial and imperial projects of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Bell 2007a, 2007b). Colonial violence was diffused throughout the entire society, often in ways that went unrecognized by the colonized themselves. Colonial pacification structured the very existence of the colonized subject. The extreme violence of colonialism had the effect of transforming the colonized subjects into a different “species” (Fanon 1963, 35–40, 43). Colonial pacification was more than direct and indirect violence; the violence of colonialism was diffuse to such an extent as to remake the psyche of the colonized, affecting their mental health and emotions (Fanon 1963, 35–106, NaN–56). It was “atmospheric violence,” a “violence rippling under the skin” (Fanon 1963, 31). Unable to lash out against the colonizer, the colonized lived everyday within a world ordered by violence. In this world, the colonized could not respond to the colonizers for fear of directly violent reprisals. In the space of a dance circle, however, the colonized could release the anger and aggression experienced on a daily basis: “Symbolic killings, fantastic rides, imaginary mass murders – all must be brought out” (Fanon 1963, 57). For the colonized, rituals such as the dance were a
means of expressing existential frustrations with and resistance to the violence of colonial pacification through reenactments of direct violence. Ultimately, anticolonial struggles exposed the violence of colonialism by directing that violence back on its authors.

Colonies, however, were not exceptional in how liberal, Western powers organized violence. Practices of colonial rule were central to developing liberal norms of sovereignty, as well as the domination and control of recalcitrant populations whether within Europe, such as the English domination of the Welsh, Irish, and Scots or outside of Europe by settler colonialists against indigenous populations (Anghie 2005; Barkawi and Stanski 2012; Lightfoot 2016; Havercroft 2008; Shaw 2008; Simpson 2014; Coulthard 2014; Deloria Jr 1974; Miller 2006; Rueda-Saiz 2017). This civilizing imagination functioned phenomenologically. It produced insiders as civilized and peaceful and outsiders as violent, external threats to civilization. In doing so, this imagination successfully obscured how the structures of liberalism produced colonial violence.\(^\text{13}\)

The idea of war as an external practice of states, not tied to their internal workings and located according to specific normative projections of Western identity, followed from this colonial mentality. This mentality legitimized the exporting of violence to create a Western imperial pax and was so widespread that it shaped the development of modern warfare (Ellis 1986; Proudhon [1861] 1998). The colonial wars reproduced and reinforced ideologies of Western superiority, evidenced in part by the West’s superior military technology. The consequence of this racist hubris was the inability to foresee the destructive

\(^{13}\) Arguments about the foundational role colonialism, primitive accumulation, and white supremacy in structuring the modern international system are particularly useful in thinking about phenomenological violence (Jones 2006; Anievas, Manchanda, and Shilliam 2015; Du Bois 1915; Shaw 2008; Coulthard 2014; Deloria Jr 1974; Lowe 2015; Hartman 1997). The legacy of these practices pervade contemporary liberal peace building (Richmond 2014; Sabaratnam 2015) and liberal global governance (Koomen 2014a, 2014b, 2013), while trade liberalization can facilitate mass violence (Kamola 2007; Smith 2016). Césaire argues that colonialism produced a “boomerang effect” within European societies; Nazism was the return of violences previously “applied only to non-European peoples” (Césaire 2000, 36). At independence, international law became a mechanism for reinforcing this international order upon the previously colonized world (Grovogui 1996).
tendencies of Western warfare when unleashed against themselves (Ellis 1986). Within the discipline, founded in response to the unexpectedly destructive character of the First World War, reproduced this understanding of war. If peace is the absence of violence, then war is the presence of violence on a mass scale. This (liberal) reading, however, misses how war may instead be a breakdown of the liberal worldhood. Moreover, the liberal story of progress serves to disguise the possibility of increasing violence within the liberal world. Liberal pacification reveals the ongoing violence at the heart of a political project that imagines itself to be against violence.

Once a liberal order of democracy, free markets, and international institutions are spread throughout the world, liberal ideology imagines peace as the end state. Yet states often deploy war under liberal guises. Wars under the aegis of humanitarian values and regime change are examples of liberal pacification that represent its multifaceted character. Liberal regimes emphasize the violence of those that they are invading, while minimizing the violence involved in these military undertakings and the violence necessary to sustain the liberal societies themselves. What Pierre-Joseph Proudhon called “the moral phenomenology of war” (Prichard 2015, 112–34; Proudhon [1861] 1998) becomes an integral part of the everyday workings of society, from justice to religion, cosmology and martial metaphors that shape innumerable aspects of our daily language. The upshot is that, within liberal ideology,

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15 Our concept of liberal pacification is not the same as “positive peace.” Paul Diehl argues that rather than focusing on the negative peace—i.e. “the absence of war”—scholars should also study “broader conceptions of peace,” namely those that include “considerations of justice, human rights, and other aspects of human security” (Diehl 2016, 9; Goertz, Diehl, and Balas 2016). Using the terms of our analysis, however, such arguments simply call upon scholars accustomed to studying peace as an absence of direct violence to expand their analyses to study how liberal institutions can find solutions to indirect violence as well. Phenomenological violence remains absent in these accounts.

the violence committed by liberal states is justified, whereas the violence committed by illiberal states is not.

Post-colonial and anarchist scholarship focuses on the incorporation of violence in the production of liberal spaces (Barkawi and Laffey 1999). These same concerns can be directed inwards onto the liberal order itself. Seen from the perspective of marginalized and oppressed populations, the structures of liberal pacification take on a distinctly violent aspect. The institutionalization of violence is central to the functioning of our world. The liberal world is not less violent, it is rather a sophisticated phenomenological process of legitimating certain types of violence in order to render other types of violence invisible.

**Liberal Pacification**

What does it mean to apply this third type of violence to our understanding of international relations? Pacification reveals liberalism as a violent process as opposed to a system that is emblematic of the absence of direct violence. It is commonplace to note the parallels between the *Pax Britannia*, *Pax Americana* and the ancient peace of the *Pax Romana* (Neocleous 2010b, 13). This narrative misses the crucial role of pacification as a distinct kind of violence in maintaining these pacific orders. Our theory offers the novel insight that incorporating pacification into the analysis of the liberal peace reveals crucial aspects of this peace that both the conventional and critical accounts neglect.

A focus on pacification provides three critical insights. First, it recovers the crucial role of pacification in the historical founding of the liberal order. Second, by distinguishing between three kinds of violence (Figure 2), we account for the empirical observations of the liberal peace as leading to a decline in direct violence and an increase in violence overall as part of the pacification of the *Pax Americana*. Conversely, the liberal version of the *Pax Americana* cannot account for key anomalies. Third, our approach draws attention to the violent ordering of social relations. This dimension of violence is neglected even in Marxist, post-colonial, neo-Gramscian, and post-structuralist critiques of the liberal peace, which primarily focus on the role of direct and indirect violence in maintaining the *Pax Americana*.

Contemporary liberal International Relations theory emphasizes the non-violent role of the liberal triad (democracy, free markets, and institutions) in causing the liberal peace. Yet a quick review of the history of liberalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries shows that key figures in liberalism from John Stuart Mill, to Joseph Galliéni, to American
foreign policy elites, understood pacification as a necessary step in establishing and maintaining the liberal order. Mill, one of the philosophical founders of liberalism, conceptualized and deployed liberalism as a domination strategy. Mill argued that it is appropriate to impose despotism or slavery on “savages” who incline to “fighting and rapine,” but the government should use force as little as possible:

> What they require is not a government of force, but one of guidance. Being, however, in too low a state to yield to the guidance of any but those to whom they look up as the possessors of force, the sort of government fittest for them is one which possesses force, but seldom uses (1998, 232–33).

In terms of our conceptual distinction, Mill argued that liberalism as pacification was a more effective instrument of violence than the direct modes of violence that governments usually deploy.

This line of reasoning runs through the subsequent history of European colonialism. “[L]iberal improvement” was a regular plank of colonial strategy by France and Britain in the nineteenth century (Owens 2015, 154). Consider one example from the French colonial tradition. Galliéni consciously deployed liberalism as a domination strategy in the pacification of Tonkin during the 1890s. Galliéni’s strategy involved slowly spreading military outposts and deploying civil administrators to create markets, schools, and amenities. The rationale was that locals would gain a personal interest in the continuation of French control and would help to quell Chinese brigandage. “Piracy,” said Galliéni, “is the result of an economic condition. It can be fought by prosperity” (Owens 2015, 157). Galliéni devised a “theory of pacification” in which “the correct combination of force and politics can socialize, pacify and domesticate a population into regulating itself” (Owens 2015, 157). What Mill proposed in theory, Galliéni enacted in practice: pacification – the violent reordering of social relations in a colony – was a more effective means of maintaining liberal rule than the deployment of direct violence.

While less explicit, the relationship between liberalism and imperialism remained present in the twentieth century development of the Pax Americana. During this era United States policy makers sought to construct a zone of peace distinct from the zones of war associated with authoritarian regimes. The United States State Department first recognized the concept of “hegemonic pacification” in the Euro-Atlantic conference diplomacy of the 1920s (Cohrs 2008, 619). The United States’ “strategic restraint” in the aftermath of World
War Two was motivated by this concept of liberal, hegemonic pacification (Ikenberry 2009). The Council on Foreign Relations convened a group of economic and political experts, the War and Peace Study Group, to help decide the scope of international arrangements that would best serve the interests of the United States. The War and Peace Study Group concluded that “the only area sufficiently large was the one equivalent to the world economy as a whole and driven by the United States” (Ikenberry 2011, 173). United States Defense officials Stimson, Patterson, McCloy, and Assistant Secretary Howard C. Peterson agreed that it was a matter of the security interests of the United States to maintain “open markets, unhindered access to raw materials, and the rehabilitation of much — if not all — of Eurasia along liberal capitalist lines” (Leffler 1984, 349–56; Barkawi and Laffey 1999). Liberalism as a domination and pacifying strategy continued throughout (and long after) the Cold War (Stokes 2003; Laffey 2003), as evident in one of the founding documents of the post-World War Two liberal order, NSC-68 (Ikenberry 2011, 168). While the enforcement of a Pax Americana eventually yielded a decline in direct violence, it produced an increase in other types of violence. The first insight of our theory is that pacification has always been part of the liberal project and that the violence in the liberal project never went away.

The second insight is that by reinterpreting the liberal peace as liberal pacification we are able to grant the empirical findings of liberal peace theorists while maintaining that the Pax Americana represents an intensification of violence overall. In the language of positivist social science our theory is observationally equivalent to that of liberal peace theory. We would expect that the quantity of direct violence inversely associates with the degree of pacification in a society. Therefore, our interpretation challenges research that identifies liberal institutions as the cause of declining violence. Liberal institutions, as apparatuses of liberal pacification, ensure that direct violence is increasingly rare while leaving the structures of violence and domination in place. In the face of observational equivalence on particular dependent variables (in our case, all forms of direct violence), it is necessary to generate novel observable implications that clearly diverge from the expectations of the current theory (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 30).

Furthermore, increased suffering in liberal societies provides evidence that contradicts the main claims of liberal peace theories, while remaining consistent with liberal pacification. At its core, liberalism is a project that tries to maximize the utility of its subjects (i.e. minimize suffering while maximizing happiness). As such, a state of liberal peace should
lead to a decrease in markers of suffering. However, the evidence of rising psychological disorders in liberal societies is extensive. A preponderance of evidence from the United States suggests that depression, anxiety, alienation, opioid dependency, stress, other related psychological disorders, increased social isolation and the decline of community have increased throughout the twentieth century (Twenge, Zhang, and Im 2004, 320; Twenge 2000; Twenge et al. 2010, 2008; S. Cohen and Janicki-Deverts 2012; Adler et al. 1994; American Society of Addiction Medicine 2016). Changes to human life associated with modernity have caused psychological stress to increase (Jackson 2014). Mortality rates have increased for some white, non-Hispanics aged 45–54 in the United States between 1999 and 2013 (Case and Deaton 2015). Modern technological advances from television to the Internet have caused increasing separation and alienation of the social human animal into individualized bodies connected by increasingly weak and empty bonds (Putnam 2000; Gray 2011; Turkle 2011). There is more slavery in the world today than ever before, with conservative estimates of between 12.3 and 27 million people in debt bondage, chattel, or contract slavery (J. A. Gordon 2012). The violent structuring of liberalism enables these

17 Much of the research we cite here is based on data from the United States, which in turn mirrors the USA-centric liberal peace literature. As a paradigmatic liberal market economy, the United States should be a most-likely case for the expectation of generally decreasing violence. John Owen, for example, argues that it is not coincidental that the “discourse and practice” of the democratic peace thesis was developed in the United States, given that American social scientists are greatly informed by the country’s “strong liberal tradition” (2011, 162). For an overview of the Eurocentric assumptions embedded within critiques of the liberal peace, see Sabaratnam (2013). Anomalous observations from the United States should raise doubts about other countries around the world. There is evidence that such trends likely generalize across liberal societies. For example, Ferrari et al. (2013) have calculated that depression is a significant and growing cause of shortened lifespan and death around the world, including within many liberal societies. With respect to the pacification of violence, we note that rioting has decreased as a share of street protest activity (relative to peaceful demonstrations) since the 1970s in most continents around the world (Murphy 2017). These data suggest that the dynamics we are theorizing are unlikely to be peculiar to the United States.
increases in social alienation, anxiety, stress and human bondage through repression, economic control and social isolation.

These are not isolated instances of suffering. They are fundamental structural features of our liberal world. Liberal theories ignore such violence as evidence of violence and discount this violence as belonging to the structures of liberalism. In other words, liberal scholars dismiss these phenomena as not being violent or as aberrations of the norm of declining violence. Hence, liberal peace theorists do not consider these to be evidence of violence that would contradict their theory. However, the increase of this violence correlates with decreasing direct violence, thus indicating the presence of pacification.

If liberalism is a process of pacification rather than simply peace, then this rise in individual suffering in liberal spaces may be evidence of a similar process that Fanon equated with the psychic life of the colonist. Just as Fanon’s colonial subjects, unable to lash out at the settler through direct violence, internalized their suffering, modern liberal subjects, unable to resist liberal pacification, internalize their suffering (1982, chap. 6; cf. Sorel 1999, 118). Liberal peace should bring about a rise in happiness; that it has instead led to rising suffering is evidence of liberal pacification.

Third, in addition to offering an alternative interpretation of the liberal peace, our theory of liberal pacification supplements key insights from critical approaches to peace. Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey’s work on imperial processes and liberal spaces makes a similar point to ours, that the celebrated zone of liberal peace rests on practices of violence (Barkawi and Laffey 1999a, 2002; Cf. Neocleous, Rigakos, and Wall 2013). Their account, however, focuses on practices of direct violence, such as humanitarian interventions against authoritarian regimes, or corporations hiring local militias to make work sites in the global south safe for economic extraction (Barkawi and Laffey 1999a, 422). Our point is that these moments of direct violence lead to pacification wherein social relations have been so violently reordered as to make direct violence no longer necessary. Once direct violence has established liberal space, pacification functions as a structure of violence that sustains the space. Direct violence only manifests itself when pacification weakens.

Pacification, however, does not merely operate through manipulating the conscience of its subjects. While Marxist and Gramscian concepts of ideology and hegemony are consistent with our theory of pacification (Peceny 1997, 418), they do not address how the
constructed political order sustains itself through a violent reordering of social relations. A Gramscian-inspired critique of the democratic peace can yield a bird’s eye view of the ways in which liberal peace theory is itself deployed as an ideological tool (Ish-Shalom 2006, 569–75). However, Gramscian-inspired approaches do not account for the ways that everyday practices of violence (e.g. surveillance technologies, implied threats from weapons, security barriers, etc.) sustain liberal pacification. While ideational factors are important in pacification, these factors rest upon practices and structures that are of an ontological-existential character.

To review, our reinterpretation of the liberal peace as liberal pacification offers three novel insights. First, liberal scholars and others associate the development of the liberal order with peace and a decline in violence by ignoring how pacification is part of the liberal project. Second, we propose that the empirically observed decline in violence equated with the liberal peace is not necessarily a sign of human progress; it could be a sign of intensified repression within and through the liberal world order. Third, our concept of pacification reveals violence that it is neither direct nor indirect but is phenomenologically structured into the world order, an insight that has not been fully addressed in critical International Relations scholarship, and largely ignored in mainstream scholarship. Understanding liberalism as pacification leads to a paradigm shift. Liberal pacification is violent in the sense that it coerces a specific type of liberal docility, while also preventing types of resistance that might be understood as violent, including riots, insurrections, civil wars and inter-state wars.

**Conclusion**

Our account of pacification recovers a crucial aspect of pax originally etched into Roman monuments. The heading of the Res Gestae (the funeral monument to Emperor Augustus) reads, “This is how he [Augustus] made the world subject to the power of the people of Rome” (Beard 2016, 364). This monument does not celebrate peace as the absence of violence; it celebrates pacification. Pax is a process that violently reorders the world so that imperial subjects are rendered incapable of using violence to resist Roman rule. The absence of overt acts of violence depends upon the maximization of pacification.

We have proposed that violence can be understood in three distinct ways. Direct violence refers to instances when an agent causes direct physical harm on another individual or group of individuals. Indirect violence refers to the aggregate actions of social groups and
institutions that cause physical harm on other social groups. Unlike direct violence, indirect violence is mediated through social groups and institutions, and its effects are not immediate. We have identified a third type of violence that we term pacification. This type of phenomenological violence includes threats, coercion, intimidation and surveillance to restructure and sustain social and political relations. When this type of violence operates effectively, it appears as though there is no violence; the violence is in the structuring of the prevailing order. While such an outcome may appear peaceful (in the sense of an absence of direct and even indirect violence), it is, at best, a negative peace that operates through a violent and coercive reordering of society.

Liberal peace advocates measure direct violence and equate the decline in that kind of violence with peace. We have countered that the spread of liberal institutions does not necessarily decrease violence but transforms it. Our phenomenological analysis captures empirical trends in human domination and suffering that liberal peace theories cannot account for, including increased inequality, slavery, anxiety, addiction, and anomie. This phenomenological analysis of the liberal peace also reveals how a decline in direct violence may actually coincide with the transformation of violence in ways that are concealed, monopolized and structured into the fabric of modern liberal society. If our theory is correct, we will find increases in markers of suffering as society liberalizes. While we cannot say whether these indicators are unique to pacified liberal societies, it is significant that they are rarely, if ever, discussed in terms of violence and the liberal peace.

Liberal pacification is observationally equivalent to liberal peace. This is not a semantic argument. Liberal peace advocates claim that processes that promote individual freedom and autonomy (i.e. democracy, free markets, and global institutions) cause peace, while we contend that insidious, coercive, and violent systems of military deterrence and compellence, nuclear terror, surveillance, and intimidation constitute the worldhood of the liberal order. The restructuring of the global order — pacification — reduces direct violence, but it also restructures social relations in ways that are violent. Declines in directly observable violence render other forms of violence invisible. The liberal peace is actually liberal pacification.

**Supplemental Information**
Information pertaining to the creation of figure 1 can be found at bit.ly/Baron-et-al-ISQ-data and at the International Studies Quarterly data archive.

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